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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the distinction between regulated futures contracts and 
unregulated commercial sale of goods contracts. Though the U.K. provides several 
guidelines to distinguish between the two, uncertainties remain, as shown in the 
judgment of CR Sugar. Certain U.S. judgments also illustrate how commodity traders 
might incorporate features of futures exchange into a spot contract and the legal risk 
involved. This paper argues that physical delivery or the intention to deliver should 
not be used as an absolute criterion. By comparing with the key characteristics of 
futures trading, this paper will show that the boundary between unregulated 
commercial sale of goods contracts and regulated futures contracts depends on 
whether a trading scheme offers a factual facility to offset contrary trades between 
two or among multiple parties. Thus, the boundary of futures regulation lies in the 
transition point between physical trading and notional trading, where transactions 
could be offset and settled in cash. 
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The focus of this paper will be the boundary of the regulation of commodity futures1. 
It will be shown that the boundary lies in the transition point between physical trading 
and notional trading2 and the key factor to determine notional trading is when a 
trading scheme offers a factual facility to offset contrary trades between two or among 
multiple traders so that transactions might be settled in cash.   
1. From CR Sugar  
We may start with an overlooked English case. In CR Sugar Trading Ltd. v. China 
National Sugar and Alcohol Group Corp.3, the claimant, CR Sugar Trading Ltd. 
(“CR”), was a sugar trader based in the U.K. CR purchased a series of put options 
written by CSW, a Chinese company, so that CR could sell quantities of raw sugar to 
CSW at the maturity of the options. As Steel J found out, the purpose of the options 
trading was to generate profit for both CR and CSW rather than the delivery of sugar.4 
CSW was able to earn premiums on the options. In contrast, the existence of the 
options allowed CR’s New York affiliate to open hedging positions on the New York 
futures market.5 Most of the options were not exercised or were simply rolled over for 
a new period. However, on one occasion when CR did exercise two of these put 
options, CSW refused to draw a letter of credit and purchase the sugar. CR duly 
demanded arbitration against CSW. CSW argued that CR was an unauthorized 
investment business in violation of the Financial Services Act 1986, and therefore the 
put options in dispute were unenforceable. 6   
                                                
1 In general, market participants use “futures” to refer to exchange-traded contracts and “forward” to 
indicate contracts for future delivery off an organised exchange. SATYAJIT DAS, DERIVATIVE 
PRODUCTS & PRICING 8-9 (3rd ed., rev. ed. 2006). However, both the U.K. and U.S. laws use the term 
“futures” to describe contracts for the sale of a commodity for future delivery at prices fixed when the 
contract is made. For simplicity, this paper will use the term “futures” in the market context. This paper 
will clearly identify when the term “futures” is used in the legal context. 
2 In this paper, “physical trading” or “real sale” refers to commodity contracts intended as commercial 
sales.  In contrast, “notional trading” or “notional sale” refers to contracts disguised in the form of sale 
of goods but not intended for delivery.  
3 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 279 (Comm. Ct.). 
4 Id. at 281. 
5 Id. at 280. 
6 Though the law applicable to the CR Sugar was the Financial Services Act 1986, a large part of the 
regulatory texts regarding the meaning of option and futures were the same as those under the current 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA 2000”). For simplicity, the discussion of this paper 
will base on current regulatory texts under the FSMA 2000. 
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Several lines of reason led Steel J to the conclusion that CR was trading sugar options 
for investment purpose in CR Sugar7. First, both parties recognised that delivery was 
not especially desirable.8 Secondly, Steel J held that “the verb ‘to use’ connotes the 
process of putting into service or consuming material”, which neither party was doing 
at that moment. Thirdly, Steel J rejected CR’s submission that “once the option is 
exercised, it is replaced by the sale agreements”, on which premise the intention to 
make delivery could be inferred;9 furthermore he held that the time to determine the 
intention of parties was when the contract was made.10 
CR Sugar might have a serious effect on the commodity market. As Henderson 
observes, “[i]t is not at all clear how far up (or down…) the distribution chain one 
must be before one is a user”11; CSW, the Chinese company, was the only beneficiary 
of the CR Sugar judgment as it earned premiums from CR and had no obligation 
under English law to take delivery of the sugar. We do not know if CR tried to 
reclaim the premiums from CSW.12 If it did, CR might have had to go to China to 
recover its money. CR probably did not have this scenario in mind when it first 
entered into options trading with CSW.  
As shown in CR Sugar, whether or not a contract is a true sale of goods has legal 
implications. At the private law level, we have to consider whether the sale of goods 
law is applicable. For example, one particular concern in the U.S. is whether the 
Statute of Frauds requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) for “[a] 
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $5,000 or more” is applicable.13 Thus, 
the lack of proper documentation at the time of derivatives trading might endanger the 
enforceability of a transaction.14 
There are more serious regulatory concerns. As it is quite common to see commercial 
contracts with a delivery date some time in the future, the distinction between 
                                                
7 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 279 (Comm. Ct). 
8 Id. at 281–283.  
9 Id. at 284.  
10 Id.  
11 SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES § 12-19 (2003). 
12 Cf. Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1 (HL); Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL). 
13 U.C.C. § 2-201. Raj Bhala, A Pragmatic Strategy for the Scope of Sales Law, the Statute of Frauds, 
and the Global Currency Bazaar, 72 DENV U.L. REV. 1 (1994).   
14 ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES § 3-17 (4th ed. 2006). If trading is simply 
done over the telephone, it could also raise questions as to whether the terms of the standard form of 
the ISDA agreement could be incorporated into the contract. E.g. Credit Suisse Financial Products v. 
Société Générale d'Enterprises [1997] CLC 168 (CA). 
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regulated “futures” contracts and unregulated commercial contracts for future delivery 
represents the difficulty in distinguishing regulated futures contract from purely 
commercial sale of goods contracts. An unavoidable result is that some forward 
contracts or options to enter into a future sale might fall under futures regulation. 
Indeed, there is a long history of trading commodities for future delivery. Hedging 
market risks by fixing future delivery prices is a strategy used by merchants all over 
the world from time immemorial. 15  Even now, some exchange-traded futures 
contracts may still allow physical delivery, though most contracts are liquidated with 
cash settlement.16  
Nevertheless, as will be shown in the following sections, it is not easy to separate 
commercial sales from commodity contracts used for investment purpose. Thus, this 
paper will take on the task of developing a theory to distinguish regulated futures 
contracts from unregulated contracts for commercial sales of goods. In the following 
sections, we will first introduce the relevant regulatory background in the U.K. and 
U.S. We will then discuss certain off-exchange commodity exchanges that raise 
regulatory concern in the U.S. In the end, we will attempt to answer the question: 
what constitutes regulated future delivery contracts? For simplicity of discussion, 
“cash market” and “spot market” mean a market where merchants make real sales, as 
opposed to the futures market. 
2. Regulatory Background  
2.2.1 U.K. Law 
In the U.K., “futures” is a kind of regulated investment. The term “futures” is defined 
as “rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity or property of any other 
description under which delivery is to be made at a future date and at a price agreed 
                                                
15 Similar strategies were used in ancient Greece and for tulip sales in Middle Age Holland in around 
2000 B.C. in the Bahrein Islands and in China. Hudson, supra note 14, at 2-01. JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 3 (1987); Victor L, Hou, 
Derivatives and Dialectics: The Evolution of Chinese Futures Market, 72 NYU L. REV. 175, 175-176 
(1997); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1996). 
16 It was reported in 1971 that approximately 99% of wheat futures traded in the CBOT were liquidated 
before making delivery. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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on when the contract is made”.17 A price is deemed to be agreed on when the contract 
is made even if the price refers to the futures market.18 The Regulatory Activities 
Order 2001 (“RAO 2001”) refines this definition by excluding “rights under any 
contract which is made for commercial and not investment purposes”.19 The RAO 
2001 further provides several guidelines to determine whether a commodity contract 
with a fixed price and a future delivery date is for commercial or for investment 
purpose. 
First, a contract is to be regarded as made for investment purposes if it is made or 
traded on an exchange 20.21 In contrast, an off-exchange contract is to be regarded as 
made for commercial purposes if under the terms of the contract delivery is to be 
made within seven days unless it can be shown that there exists an understanding that 
delivery would not be made within seven days.22 
Secondly, where a contract is neither traded in a recognised exchange nor deemed to 
exist for commercial purposes, the RAO 2001 provides certain “indications” for use 
in such eventualities. On the one hand, a contract might be made for commercial 
purposes if one party is the producer of the commodity or if such commodity is used  
in his business or if the seller intends to make delivery (or the buyer intends to accept 
delivery) thereof.23 It is also an indication for commercial purpose if the terms of the 
contract are tailor-made by parties rather than “by reference (or not solely by 
reference) to regularly published prices, to standard lots or delivery dates or to 
standard terms”.24 In contrast, it is an indication that a contract is made for investment 
purposes if it is expressed to be as traded on an exchange, if the performance of the 
contract is ensured by an investment exchange or a clearing house, or if there are 
arrangements for the payment or provision of margin.25  
                                                
17 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulatory Activities) Order 2001 SI 2001/544 art 84(1) 
(RAO 2001). We should be aware that the definition in paragraph 18 of the Schedule 2 of FSMA 2000 
does not require the price to be agreed on when the contract is made.   
18 RAO 2001 § 84(8).  
19 Id. § 84(2). The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) also excludes commodity 
futures, forwards or options for commercial purpose from its application. MiFID 2004/39/EC Annex 1 
Section C paragraphs 6, 7 & 10. 
20 FSMA 2000 §285 et seq.  
21 RAO 2001 § 84(3).  
22 Id. § 84(4).   
23 Id. § 84(5).  
24 Id. § 84(6). 
25 Id. § 84(7). 
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2.2.2 U.S. Law 
In the U.S., the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) provides that it should be 
unlawful for any person to enter into “a contract for the purchase or sale of a 
commodity for future delivery” unless “such transaction is conducted on or subject to 
the rules of a board of trade which has been designated or registered … as a contract 
market” and is “executed or consummated by or through a contract market”.26 The 
term “board of trade” means “any organized exchange or other trading facility.”27 
The definition of “commodity” includes a lengthy list of agricultural products and the 
general phrase “all other goods and articles … and all services, rights, and interests in 
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in”.28 Sugar is 
not clearly listed but was held to be a commodity under the CEA.29 A contract for sale 
of precious metals, crude oil or natural gas has also been held to be within the 
jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). 30 
Nevertheless, retail contracts for foreign currency traded off exchanges are excluded 
from the CEA.31 
The so-called “cash forward” exception raised most legal problems. The CEA 
provides that “[t]he term ’future delivery’ does not include any sale of any cash 
commodity for deferred shipment or delivery”.32 The application of the cash forward 
exception is not as straightforward as the statutory texts might suggest. In CFTC v. Co 
Petro Marketing Group33, the leading authority on the cash forward exception, Co 
Petro offered and sold to customers contracts for the future purchase of petroleum 
products. Under their agreement,  
 
The customer (1) appointed Co Petro as his agent to purchase a specified 
quantity and type of fuel at a fixed price for delivery at an agreed future date, 
and (2) paid a deposit based upon a fixed percentage of the purchase price. 
Co Petro, however, did not require its customer to take delivery of the fuel. 
Instead, at a later specified date the customer could appoint Co Petro to sell 
the fuel on his behalf. If the cash price had risen in the interim, Co Petro was 
                                                
26 7 U.S.C. § 6.  
27 7 U.S.C. § 1a(2).   
28 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4).  
29 Poplar Grove Planting &Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 585 (Md. La. 1979). 
30 See, e.g., CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).  
31 7 U.S.C. § 2(c); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 US 465 (1997); CFTC v. Zelender, 373 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2004).  
32 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19).  
33 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).  
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to (1) remit the difference between the original purchase price and the 
subsequent sale price, and (2) refund any remaining deposit. If the cash price 
had decreased, Co Petro was to (1) deduct from the deposit the difference 
between the purchase price and the subsequent sale price, and (2) remit the 
balance of the deposit to the customer.34 
 
Co Petro’s contracts are very much like exchange-traded futures except that Co Petro 
is not an organised exchange and customers may not trade contracts with each other.35 
Co Petro argued that their contracts fell within the cash forward exception. As to 
whether Co Petro’s contracts were in law commodity futures, the court held that “no 
bright-line definition or list of characterizing elements is determinative. The 
transaction must be viewed as a whole with a critical eye toward its underlying 
purpose”.36 The court cited the broad definition of “board of trade” and decided that 
“[t]he contracts here represent speculative ventures in commodity futures which were 
marketed to those for whom delivery was not an expectation”.37   
As to the cash forward exception, the court held that “[t]here is nothing in the 
legislative history surrounding cash forward contracts to suggest that Congress 
intended the exclusion to encompass agreements for the future delivery of 
commodities sold merely for purposes of such speculation.”38 In the end, Co Petro 
was held to violate the CEA.   
It would be too cumbersome to have a full account of case laws on the interpretation 
of the language of the CEA after Co Petro. Some of the arguments involved will be 
introduced below. At this stage, we should bear in mind that the intention of parties to 
deliver under a contract is an important criterion for determining whether the cash 
forward exception applies to this contract.  
                                                
34 Id. at 576.  
35 Co Petro did apply to the CFTC but failed to acquire a license as a designated contract market. Id. at 
581.  
36 Id. This is later referred to as the “totality of circumstances” test. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 579. 
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3. Off-exchange Commodity Contracts with 
Exchange-like Features 
The U.K. and U.S. regulations raise two questions: “what are ‘futures’ in the eyes of 
law?” and “why do we regulate ‘futures’?” These questions were not fully answered 
in CR Sugar. Organised exchanges are undoubtedly the focus of regulation. 39 
Nevertheless, since commodity traders might use futures prices or exchange-like 
features in spot market transactions, most legal uncertainties from the legal meaning 
of “futures” fall on off-exchange commodity contracts.  
3.1 Hedge-to-Arrive Contracts  
So-called “hedge-to-arrive” contracts (“HTA”) in the U.S. represent an interesting 
angle from which to observe how an off-exchange trading contract might look like an 
exchange-traded futures contract. Grain farmers have a strong interest to manage the 
fluctuation of grain prices, so several contractual arrangements have been developed 
in the grain market in order to reduce risks from seasonal variations in commodity 
prices.40 HTAs might be traced back to a popular type of forward contracts in the 19th 
century called “to arrive” contracts41, which later became more standardised and gave 
birth to the first organised exchange in the world, the Chicago Board of Trade.42   
In short, an HTA contract is a transaction by which:  
 
[A] grain producer agrees to deliver at an unspecified time a predetermined 
quantity and grade of grain. The price of the grain is determined by reference to a 
futures contract price established by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), plus or 
minus a variable component referred to as the “basis”. Basis is the difference 
between the price of the designated futures contact and the cash price for that 
commodity. … The basis remains unfixed, or ‘floating’, until the farmer elects to 
fix the basis at which point the grain will be delivered.  Under an HTA, a farmer 
has at least two sale options on his crop: he can deliver grain under the HTA, or 
                                                
39 E.g., RAO 2001 §§ 84(3) & (7). 
40 1996 CFTC Ltr. 145, 5-6.  
41 Romano, supra note 15, at 7. The “to arrive” contract originated from Europe. DAN MORGAN, 
MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 59 (1980); Markham, supra note 15, at 3; Glenn Willett Clark, Genealogy and 
Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Delivery" in the Commodity Exchange Act 
Symposium: Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175 (1978).  
42 CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 4 et seq. (1997); Markham, supra note 
15, at 3-4.  
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he can defer delivery on (i.e. ‘roll’) the contract if he thinks he can get a better 
price in the cash-grain market.43  
 
There are several types of HTA transactions. The basic type (or so-called “non-roll”) 
is where the contract price is determined by the futures market plus or minus the 
“basis” and with a fixed future delivery date.44 The futures price is fixed at first, but 
the basis can be determined later.45 Thus, the seller should investigate and predict the 
movements of the spot market prices and the futures market so as to maximise his 
profits. Therefore, the price mechanism in a basic HTA is simply a method for setting 
the contract price.46 
What makes HTAs more intriguing is the “rolling” clause.47 In the case of some 
HTAs, the contracts provide that the seller may defer delivery to a later date if the 
price in the cash market on the original delivery date is higher than the HTA contract 
price. This means that the seller can avoid virtual losses from an HTA by selling the 
grain in the spot market and delaying the delivery.  
Since grain is a seasonal product, a seller/farmer might not have enough grain in stock 
when delivery has to be made at the later stage, in which case he might have to buy 
grain on the cash market to meet his delivery obligations. Then, the farmer is again 
exposed to price risk in the delivery stage. Thus, an HTA is rather a speculative 
vehicle for farmers.48 Since a buyer-elevator usually uses the CBOT to hedge against 
risks from HTAs, the rolling process means that grain elevators must close their 
existing open interests and acquire new hedges in the futures market.   
Problems arose soon after the historically high price in 1995.49 While farmers seemed 
to gain from the high spot prices by rolling over their HTAs, grain elevators suffered 
huge losses because they had to liquidate their short futures positions in the CBOT at 
                                                
43 Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 741-742 (8th Cir. 2003), citing Grain 
Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farms, Inc., 199 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1999). 
44 A “basis” is defined as the difference between the spot market price (e.g. May corn price) and the 
most imminent futures prices (May corn futures price in the CBOT). SATYAJIT DAS, STRUCTURED 
PRODUCTS VOLUME 1: EXOTIC OPTIONS; INTEREST RATES & CURRENCY 117 (3rd ed., rev. ed., 2006). 
45 A contrary type of HTA is called a “basis contract”, in which the basis is fixed at the beginning but 
the futures price level can be chosen later.  
46 Nicholas P. Iavarone, Understanding the Hedge-to-Arrive Controversy, 2 Drake J. Agric. L. 371, 
374 (1997).  
47 HTAs with a rolling clause are sometimes called “flex”. Grain Land Coop, supra note 43, at 987. 
48 Iavarone, supra note 46.   
49 Grain Land Coop, supra n 43, at 987-988. 
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very disadvantageous prices.50 Disputes soon broke out and one important legal issue 
was whether HTAs were regulated “futures contracts”.51 A series of HTA cases arose 
in the Midwest of the U.S.52 One legal issue for market participants was whether 
HTAs were regulated “futures” under the CEA and whether the HTAs fell within the 
cash forward exception.    
In Nagel v. ADM Investor Services, Inc.53 Judge Posner adopted the “totality of the 
circumstances” test first proposed in Co Petro and proposed a few factors for 
consideration:  
 
(1) The contract specifies idiosyncratic terms regarding place of delivery, 
quantity, or other terms, and so is not fungible with other contracts for the 
sale of the commodity, as securities are fungible. …; 
(2) The contract is between industry participants, such as farmers and grain 
merchants, rather than arbitrageurs and other speculators who are interested 
in transacting in contracts rather than in the actual commodities.  
(3) Delivery cannot be deferred forever, because the contract requires the 
farmer to pay an additional charge every time he rolls the hedge.54 
 
Of course, the application of the above test varies contract by contract, and thus it 
would be difficult to conclude that all HTAs are or are not regulated futures contracts 
without examining carefully the contractual terms of each transaction.55 Assuming a 
fixed delivery date and obligation, a basic HTA seems no different from other 
contract for sale of grain except that the price term is more flexible.   
In contrast, the rolling clause adds some liquidity to the basic HTA(s), as a farmer 
might sell his grain in the cash market if the spot price is more favourable. The U.S. 
court seemed ready to conclude that rolling HTAs fell within the cash forward 
exception as long as delivery obligation might not be deferred forever.56 On the other 
hand, cash forwards or not, HTAs still use complicated financing techniques and there 
                                                
50 Matthew J. Cole, Hedge-to-arrive Contracts: the Second Chapter of the Farm Crisis, 1 Drake J. 
Agric. L. 243 (1996).  
51 In 1996, the CFTC issued a letter explaining CFTC’s opinion on the matter. However, the CFTC was 
reluctant to make a final decision and preferred to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. 1996 CFTC 
Ltr. 145. 
52 See, e.g., Asa-Brandt, Inc, 344 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2003); Nagel v. ADM Investor Services, Inc., 217 
F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2000); Lachmund v. ADM Investor Service, Inc., 191 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Grain Land Coop v. Kar Kim Farm, 199 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1999); Andersons, Inc v. Horton Farms, 
Inc., 166 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 1998); Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investor Inc., 3 F.Supp.2d 1024 (ND L. 1998). 
53 217 F.3d 436 (2000). 
54 Id. at 441.  
55 Id. 
56 See supra note 52. 
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is a question of whether farmers understand the nature of the market and the potential 
impact of signing an HTA agreement. This led to further disputes regarding the 
liability of a financing company when promoting an HTA to farmers or grain 
merchants.57 
In the end, the possible outcome of applying U.K. law to the HTA cases should be 
considered. First, HTAs, basic or rolling, should satisfy the definition of a futures 
contract with delivery to be made at a future date and a predetermined method to 
decide sales prices by reference to the exchange market.58 The next issue is whether 
HTAs are for commercial purposes or for investment purposes. HTAs cannot be 
regarded as being for investment purposes because they are not traded on organised 
exchanges.59 Nor could we presume that they are for commercial purposes as delivery 
would most likely not be made within seven days. Unlike CR Sugar60, farmers who 
enter into HTAs are actually grain producers, and grain merchants and millers who 
generally use grain for their own business. In addition, HTAs do require delivery, 
even rolling HTAs. Therefore, we may conclude that HTAs are more likely to be seen 
as futures contracts for commercial purposes and might not be regulated under the 
FSMA 2000 as long as they are between farmers and grain merchants.  
3.2 Chain of Sales: Circle or Book-out Clauses  
Without the establishment of a clearing house, it is still possible for merchants to clear 
their transactions based on bilateral agreements. In practice, it is not uncommon that a 
seller in a transaction becomes a buyer of the same amount of the same goods in 
another deal, possibly leading to a chain of sales.61   
Some standard forms contain a clause dealing with situations as mentioned above. A 
“circle clause” can be found on the GAFTA forms and FOSFA forms concerning 
grain sales. Such clause stipulates: 
 
Where Sellers re-purchase from their Buyers or from any subsequent Buyer 
the same goods or part thereof, a circle shall be considered to exist as regards 
the particular goods so re-purchased. …  [In this situation,] “if the goods are 
                                                
57 Asa-Brandt, Inc., 344 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2003).  
58 RAO 2001 §§ 84(1) & (8).  
59 Id. § 84(3).  
60 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 279 (Comm. Ct).  
61 A typical chain of sales could be seen in Tradax Export SA v. Carapelli SpA [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
157 (Comm. Ct.). 
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not appropriated, or, having been appropriated documents are not presented, 
invoices based on the mean contract quantity shall be settled by all Buyers 
and their Sellers in the circle by payment by all Buyers to their Sellers of the 
excess of the Sellers' invoice amount over the lowest invoice amount in the 
circle.62   
 
Similar terms appear in the 15-day Brent crude oil market.63 The 15-day Brent crude 
oil contract usually contains a “book-out” provision that works like the circle clause 
mentioned above. The difference in the 15-day Brent market is that the relevant 
parties have to reach a “book-out” agreement to determine a “base price” as the basis 
to calculate their respective payment obligations among parties. 64  As a judge 
observed, “[o]n the choice of a base price depended not only the amount payable on a 
book-out under each of the contracts in the [chain], but also whether it was the buyer 
or the seller who would in fact make the appropriate payment.”65 
With the help of the book-out clause, the 15-day market provides an example of how 
spot market trades can evolve into an exchange-like contract market and become a 
harbour for hedging or speculation. In a market with a limited number of participants, 
it is not difficult to spot a chain of sales and so to initiate a book-out. Thus, the result 
of a book-out or circle clause might turn an ordinary sale into an exchange-like 
notional transaction, which enhances the chance for treating the contract as a 
regulated futures contract.   
In Transnor (Bermuda), Ltd. v. BP North America Petroleum, Inc. 66  Transnor 
purchased some North Sea crude oil from BP on the basis of a 15-day Brent contract. 
However, after realising that the oil price dropped after the contract was made, 
Transnor refused to take delivery and subsequently sued BP for violation of U.S. 
antitrust law by conspiring with other companies to depress oil price and of the CEA 
                                                
62 See, e.g., GAFTA Contract No.100 (Contract for Shipment of feeding stuffs in Bulk Tale Quale−CIF 
Terms) clause 29; FOSFA Contract No 53 (Contract for Vegetable and Marine Oil (in bulk) FOB 
Terms) clause 25. 
63 The off-exchange Brent crude oil contract can be divided into two categories: the “dated” contract 
and the “15-day” contract. In the dated contract, the delivery date is specified in the contract. In 
contrast, the “15-day” contract has no specific delivery date but allows the seller to give notice to 
nominate the delivery date 15 days prior to the intended delivery day (thereby giving rise to the name 
“15-day Brent”). DAVID LONG, OIL TRADING MANUAL § 4.2 (1995); CFTC Statutory Interpretation, 55 
Fed. Reg. 39188 (1990). 
64 Long, id., at 12.3. 
65 Voest Alpine Intertrading GmbH v. Chevron International Oil Co Ltd. [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 547, 
558 (QB).  
66 738 F.Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  
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by manipulating the market. The antitrust claim is not our concern here, so we will 
focus on the CEA claim below.   
Transnor raised the question of whether a 15-day Brent contract (with a book-out 
clause) was a regulated futures contract under U.S. law. Naturally, BP argued that the 
15-day Brent contract was a “cash forward” rather than a “futures” contract. The 
District Court judge acknowledged that  
 
15-day Brent contracts may represent binding commitments to buy or sell 
physical oil. The real question, however, is whether the transactions are more 
like bargains for the purchase and sale of crude oil than speculative 
transactions tacitly expected to end by means other than delivery.67   
 
Applying the Co Petro decision,68 the court drew the conclusion that “[t]he high 
levels of speculation and performance without delivery, as well as the relatively 
standardized contracts, distinguish the 15-day Brent transactions from the forward 
contracts contemplated by the drafters of the [CEA].”69 
In addition, the judge found that “’only a minority of transactions in the Brent market 
result in delivery.’ … The customary use of offsetting and booking out strongly 
suggests that physical delivery was not contemplated by the parties.”70 The judge also 
took note of the fact that the 15-day Brent contract enjoyed a high degree of 
standardisation of terms and that there existed investment or brokerage houses for 
Brent trading. 71  The judge further found that “[w]hile there is no contractual 
entitlement to satisfy Brent obligations by means other than delivery, the likelihood of 
avoiding delivery has enabled participants to develop what is essentially a ‘paper’ 
market for speculative or hedging purposes rather than one for physical transfer.”72 
So the court did not find any difficulty in judging that, under the CEA, 15-day Brent 
contracts were “futures” contracts. As the judge stated, “[t]he volume of contracts 
traded and the high standardization of the contracts demonstrate the essential 
investment character of the 15-day Brent market. ‘With an eye toward [their] 
                                                
67 Id. at 1491-1492. 
68 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).  
69 Transnor, 738 F.Supp. at 1491 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
70 Id. at 1492. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
 14 
underlying purpose,’ the Court concludes that Transnor's 15-day Brent transactions 
constitute futures contracts.”73 
Given the size and importance of the Brent crude oil market, the Transnor decision 
might worry many oil traders. Soon after the Transnor decision, the CFTC issued a 
statutory interpretation to clarify the issue.74 Two points in the CFTC’s conclusion 
may be noted. First, if the book-out is reached by an individually negotiated 
agreement rather than by a pre-determined method of settlement in an existing 
contract (as in Voest Alpine), this is an indication that the relevant 15-day Brent 
trading contracts are for real commercial purposes rather than for speculation.75 
Secondly, it seems that, if a 15-day Brent contract were made between commercial 
parties in connection with their business, this transaction would also fall beyond the 
jurisdiction of the CFTC.76 
There is no U.K. authority on the regulatory issue of the circle or book-out clause.  
The question is whether a contract is made for investment purpose or for commercial 
purpose. Applying the analysis in CR Sugar77, it might be supposed that an English 
court would reach the same conclusion as that drawn by the CFTC, if the book-out is 
reached by individually negotiated terms78 and parties actually produce or use Brent 
oil in their business.79 In contrast, if the circle or book-out clauses are used as a means 
to conduct notional trading without any real intention to take or accept delivery of the 
underlying commodities, this might raise further regulatory concerns regarding 
notional trading. However, the intention of all relevant parties must be examined in 
order to reach a firm conclusion. It would increase the difficulty to argue that 
contracts with circle or book-out clauses should be regulated “futures” if one or more 
parties to a chain of sale intend the trade to result in a physical exchange of goods.   
                                                
73 Id. at 1493.  
74 CFTC Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39188.  
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 279 (Comm. Ct.).  
78 RAO 2001 § 84(6).  
79 RAO 2001 § 84(5). 
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3.3 Contradictory Transactions between Same 
Two Parties 
Two contractual parties might insert a term in their contract(s) to initiate a book-out 
process to settle two or more transactions between them in cash. In this way, a 
customer might buy and sell commodities with the same seller without even 
possessing the commodities. Co Petro80 is a typical example. Another American case 
is worth mentioning.   
In Re Bybee81, Bybee conducted silver trading with A-Mark, partly on his own 
account and partly for his customers. Two forms of transactions took place between 
Bybee and A-Mark. The first was an immediate delivery sale; and the court found 
that, in 98% of cases, this type of transactions led to physical delivery. The second 
type, called “deferred delivery sale”, was more troublesome as Bybee and his 
customers did not have to take delivery on deferred delivery sales. Instead, they could 
make a down payment to A-Mark (with the balance secured by a lien on the 
undelivered metals) and store the metal at A-Mark for up to two years. After a fall in 
silver prices, Bybee could not meet A-Mark’s margin call and had to liquidate his 
trading with A-Mark at a loss. Failing to make up his shortfall via commodities 
trading, Bybee filed protection for bankruptcy. The trustee-in-bankruptcy then sought 
to rescind Bybee’s transactions with A-Mark on the ground that they were off-
exchange futures contracts and in violation of the CEA. The issue was whether their 
transactions fell within the cash forward exception.   
Applying Co Petro82 and CFTC’s interpretation,83 the court first recognised that A-
Mark represented that the metal contracts could be settled by offsetting contracts and 
held that the contracts in question were “futures” contracts.84 Secondly, as to the cash 
forward, the court focused on the enforceability of the delivery obligation between 
Bybee and A-Mark and decided that “both A-Mark and Bybee had the legal 
                                                
80 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).  
81 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991).  
82 Supra note 80. 
83 Supra note 74.   
84 Supra note 81, at 313. 
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obligation to make or take delivery upon demand of the other”.85 Thus, the contracts 
in question were held to fall within the cash forward exception.   
Co Petro and Bybee represent a situation where a transaction between the same two 
parties might be settled with another contradictory transaction. If the same disputes 
were to face U.K. courts, U.K. judges might conduct a similar line of analysis by 
examining the parties’ intention to make delivery.86 The two parties in Bybee did not 
really offset contradictory transactions and settle by cash (except when Bybee was 
unable to meet its margin call). Bybee or its clients might not hold the metals in 
person, but they might claim delivery of the metals if they so wanted. Thus, Bybee 
actually made profits from trading metals without putting metals into service or using 
them for consumption. This makes Bybee comparable to CR Sugar in England. In the 
end, it depends on whether the FSMA 2000 intends to regulate metal traders who 
have no interests in using metals into service or in manufacturing but only in buying 
and selling metals for profits.   
4. The Boundary of Futures Regulation: 
When Physical Sales Meet Notional 
Transactions 
4.1 Objectives of Futures Regulations 
Having introduced hedge-to-arrive contracts (incorporating futures prices into a spot 
market trade and roll-over trades), circle or book-out clauses used to resolve a chain 
of sale (multi-party settlement of contracts), and book-outs between the same two 
parties (a bilateral trading scheme), what can we learn from the above discussion? On 
each occasion, the U.S. court had to decide whether the contract in question was a 
regulated futures contract under the CEA and whether the contract was a cash forward 
contract for deferred delivery. U.K. courts and the Financial Services Authority might 
face similar questions. In essence, this is about what kind of future delivery contracts 
should be regulated as “futures”. The policy concerns may vary country by country; 
                                                
85 Id. at 315.  
86 RAO 2001 § 84(5)(b).  
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thus, we cannot assume that the U.K. law should be interpreted in a way consistent 
with the U.S. law, or vice versa. However, we could develop a general theory to help 
rationalise futures regulation in the U.K. and the U.S. that would help to identify 
policy considerations and reduce legal uncertainties for commodity traders. To 
produce a theory like this, we must understand why we regulate off-exchange 
commodity forward contracts.   
The regulatory objectives of the FSMA 2000 are to maintain confidence in the 
financial system, to raise public awareness of the financial system, to secure the 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers, and to reduce financial crimes.87 The 
“financial system” includes financial markets and exchanges, regulated activities, and 
other activities connected with financial markets and exchanges.88 Thus, the FSMA 
2000 has a strong interest in regulating the “financial market”, broadly speaking, 
which includes organised exchanges and the off-exchange market.   
The regulatory objectives should be used as a guideline when interpreting related 
rules under the FSMA 2000. The distinction between commercial and investment 
purposes shows that the FSMA 2000 would govern future delivery contracts that are 
used as investments rather than for other commercial activities. However, the terms 
“investment” and “commercial” are both tricky words that are not mutually exclusive 
of each other. Since the indications given in the RAO 2001 are only guidelines rather 
than a checklist, having a proper understanding of what investment is might help us to 
interpret the FSMA 2001 and related rules in a correct way.   
On the other hand, the implementation of the CEA in the U.S. shows a strong desire 
to prevent market speculation. The promulgation of the CEA and its predecessors was 
a result of excessive speculation and price manipulation.89 Thus, whether a contract 
may become a tool of speculation is an important criterion for U.S. courts.90   
Having observed various types of transactions, we could draw a continuum: at the one 
end are contracts of sale of goods whose delivery is made immediately; at the other 
end, futures exchanges provide facilities for multi-party trading and are now largely 
used for notional transactions. Between the two extremes, it is unavoidable that 
                                                
87 FSMA 2000 §§ 3–6.  
88 FSMA 2000 § 3(2).  
89 Co Petro, 680 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Markham, supra note 15.  
90 Co Petro, id.  
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market participants have to buy or sell something that is delivered in the future. The 
temporal gap between the conclusion of the contract and delivery leaves some room 
for contractual parties to manoeuvre. Thus, parties might twist price terms (e.g. 
HTAs) or allow parties to roll delivery over to a later stage (e.g. rolling HTAs), to 
resolve a chain of sale (e.g. 15-day Brent contracts), or to settle multiple transactions 
between two or among several parties. On this basis, we will proceed to search for 
defining factors that distinguish regulated future delivery contracts from unregulated 
ones.  
4.2 Delivery as the Defining Factor?  
From CR Sugar and U.S. case laws introduced above, we may find that an obligation 
to make and accept delivery is an important factor when determining whether a 
contract is for commercial purpose or is a cash forward contract. Indeed, at the 
commercial end, the delivery of goods is the best illustration of a true “sale”.91 
Making and taking delivery is apparently evidence that a contract is for commercial 
purposes.92  However, it is arguable that delivery should not be used as the only 
defining factor to distinguish unregulated commercial contracts from regulated futures 
contracts.   
First, for a contract for future delivery, whether or not delivery is made is only known 
in hindsight. No problem arises if delivery has been made and accepted or when a 
contract has already been settled in cash. However, in most cases, we may only 
examine the parties’ intention to see whether they really want the commodities to be 
delivered. But determining a party’s intention is not an easy task; for example, 
delivery might be rolled over several times (e.g. rolling HTAs), or a party might not 
even take physical control of the commodities, though he might demand to have 
physical possession (e.g. Bybee93). Arguments resorting to parties’ intentions would 
eventually have to depend on evidence. Different judges might reach different 
conclusions. The Ninth Circuit Court in the U.S. was more generous in Bybee, but the 
District Court in New York was more stringent in Transnor. Relying on the intention 
                                                
91 One American source seemed to emphasis that only a real sale could trigger the cash forward 
exception. Glenn L. Norris, et al., Hedge to Arrive Contracts and the Commodity Exchange Act: A 
Textual Alternative, 47 Drake L. Rev. 319 (1999).  
92 In the U.K., Sale of Goods Act 1979 § 2(4). In the U.S., U.C.C. § 2-106(1). 
93 945 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1991).  
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to deliver is hardly satisfactory as there is no clear defining line and there might be 
legal uncertainties for commodity traders.   
Secondly, another argument is that one may also make or take delivery through 
exchange trading, a primary target of futures regulation. As Judge Easterbrook 
observed in CFTC v. Zelender:  
 
Every commodity futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
calls for delivery. Every trader has the right to hold the contract through 
expiration and to deliver or receive the cash commodity. Financial futures, by 
contrast, are cash settled and do not entail ‘delivery’ to any participant. Using 
‘delivery’ to differentiate between forward and futures contracts yields 
indeterminacy, because it treats as the dividing line something the two forms 
of contract have in common for commodities and that both forms lack for 
financial futures.94 
 
Thus, it is not proper to rely on delivery or the intention to deliver as the sole standard 
for distinguishing unregulated commercial contracts from regulated futures.   
Thirdly, as Judge Easterbrook also observed, there is a difference between financial 
assets (e.g. stock) and commodities (e.g. crude oil). In general, we may assume that 
one is making an investment when one buys a share in a company. It does not change 
the fact that a transaction is for investment purpose even if a stock is delivered. In 
contrast, a commodity transaction might be for commercial purposes (e.g. for further 
manufacture) or for investment purposes. For example, it is deemed a commercial 
activity if a person buys ten gold ingots and uses them to produce golden rings for 
further sale in the market. In contrast, a person buys ten gold ingots, stores them in his 
house, and expects to sell them if the gold price moves to a good position. Literally, 
this is still an investment, but whether this kind of activity requires regulation is a 
question that regulators should consider. Delivery might be one important criterion, 
but it does not really provide a clear line between commerce and investment.   
Fourthly, it is inappropriate to assume that non-delivery (or the lack of intention to 
make delivery) makes a transaction regulated “futures”. If we accept that delivery of 
an off-exchange commodity contract makes a transaction commercial, it immediately 
follows that non-commercial transactions (i.e. for investment purpose under U.K. 
law) do not require delivery. It would be a logical error to assume that non-delivery 
                                                
94 373 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2004).  
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makes a transaction non-commercial, as a seller might not make delivery for several 
reasons: he might simply want to breach the contract, or he might be excused from 
non-delivery for other legal reasons (e.g. frustration). Nevertheless, we do not see 
these situations as signs that such a contract would be a regulated “futures” contract. 
The defining line must derive from other factors.  
Lastly, we are currently focusing on individual contracts to determine whether parties 
have made or have the intention to do so. However, we usually take into account 
several transactions between (or among) parties before determining whether relevant 
contracts for delivery are legally “futures”. In short, contracts between parties become 
“futures” through consideration of the whole trading scheme rather than individual 
contracts. In CR Sugar, Co Petro, and Bybee, multiple transactions took place 
between the same two parties. In Transnor, the U.S. court analysed the general usage 
of 15-day Brent contracts in the spot oil market.95 Focusing on how contracts of the 
same type are performed enables judges to observe how transactions are conducted 
overall (including delivery and non-delivery) before making a decision.   
In short, delivery or the intention to make or take delivery is a sign that a transaction 
is for commercial purposes. However, delivery and the intention to make delivery 
should not be the defining factor for distinguishing regulated “futures” contracts from 
unregulated commercial contracts.     
4.3 Reference from Exchange Trading 
Let us now turn to exchange trading for clues. In essence, exchange trading has 
certain key features. First, an exchange contract is highly standardised such that price 
is the only element subject to negotiation. Secondly, through a series of novations, 
exchange contracts are transformed into contracts between clearing houses and 
clearing members.96 Thirdly, with the help of the mark-to-market strategy and the use 
of margin97, each exchange contract should eventually have the same price term at the 
                                                
95 However, in Transnor, only one transaction took place between the two parties. It is apparently more 
difficult to judge the nature of a whole trading scheme if there is only one transaction between parties.   
96 See, e.g., in the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), an exchange contract will 
eventually be novated as a contract between a clearing member and the clearing house. LIFFE Rules, 
Book 2, § 4.12.4. 
97 Margin is a mechanism for clearing houses to control the credit risk of market participants. When 
making a trade, the trader must pay a certain amount of cash or collateral into the account (generally 
called “initial margin”) to guarantee performance. By using the so-called “mark-to-market” strategy on 
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end of a trading day so that opposite contractual positions can cancel each other out 
smoothly. Fourthly, the “contract” itself virtually becomes the basic unit of trading in 
a futures exchange. The terms of an exchange contract (but the rules of exchanges and 
clearing houses) no longer dominate the management of risk allocation and the rights 
and obligations of parties. Lastly, even though the futures market is now largely for 
notional trading, we found that the futures market is still capable of making delivery, 
should an exchange contract so requires98. We will examine these characteristics one 
by one. 
First, it might be supposed that a commodity exchange must have standardised 
contracts. However, this only leads to the conclusion that a lack of standardised 
contracts bars a trading scheme from also being an exchange. In other words, the 
presence of standardised terms might be an indication that a trading scheme is a 
futures exchange, but it does not help to decide whether an off-exchange contract 
should be a regulated “futures” contract. 
Secondly, public bidding of prices is a trademark of the exchange market. However, it 
may also be argued that public bidding of prices is an indication that a trading scheme 
is like an exchange. In other words, a trading scheme might not be an exchange 
without a public bidding of prices. But this does not answer the question whether off-
exchange trading contracts should be regulated.   
Thirdly, the intervention of a clearing house is one important characteristic of 
exchange trading.99 Two arguments may be taken against using the clearing house as 
a defining factor for regulated future delivery contracts. On the one hand, it is not 
impossible that delivery is intended to take place via a clearing house; thus, one might 
reach one’s commercial goals (e.g. acquiring metals) via a clearing house.100 On the 
other hand, if we accept that exchange trading must have an accompanying clearing 
house, it follows that a trading scheme cannot be an exchange without a clearing 
                                                                                                                                      
a daily basis, the clearing house adjusts the amount in the margin account to reflect daily profits or 
losses on futures contracts. If the money in the margin account drops below a certain level, the trader 
must inject more money (called a “maintenance margin”) into the account; otherwise his positions will 
be liquidated. E.g., LIFFE Rules Book 2, § 3.27; CBOT Rule 430.00 et seq.; LCH General 
Regulations, Regulation 12. 
98 See, e.g., the WTI crude oil futures traded in the New York Mercantile Exchange. 
99 See RAO 2001 § 84(7)(b).  
100 For example, through the Sword system developed by the London Clearing House and the London 
Metal Exchange, a metal trader might have good access to the storage of metals around the world if 
over-the-counter clearing for metal contracts is allowed.  
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house. There is no relationship between this and off-exchange commodity 
transactions.   
Fourthly, the margin and mark-to-market strategy is not exclusive to exchange 
trading, as the same approach might be used for off-exchange commodity trading 
contracts101 and even gambling contracts.102 After all, margin is collateral and parties 
are free to make collateral agreements to meet specific needs.  
This leaves us with one crucial characteristic of future exchanges: the possibility to 
offset contrary trades. Offsetting contrary transactions makes the whole trading 
scheme notional, and notional transactions facilitate speculation. By cancelling out 
trading contracts, the contract itself becomes a unit of trade and might then be turned 
into a means to conduct speculation or hedging. In essence, notional transactions trade 
“in the contract” and physical transactions trade “in the commodity”.103 It is in cases 
of the former type that financial regulators have an interest to intervene.  
Co Petro 104  provides a typical example because the trading scheme is largely 
notional.105 In contrast, we believe that the HTAs, though using complicated price 
terms, were still largely used by farmers and grain merchants to trade grain; thus, the 
U.S. courts were right to leave the HTAs outside the reach of the CFTC.   
The Transnor106 judgment might require further thought. While some traders might 
use the same 15-day Brent contract to profit from oil price differences, book-outs 
under 15-day Brent contracts normally require two or more parties (such as in Voest 
Alpine107).  It may be argued that whether a 15-day Brent contract is notional or 
physical should be determined on a factual basis, rather than on how most market 
participants use the contract. If all relevant parties in a circle intend to abuse the circle 
or book-out clause as a means to settle their contracts in cash, this opens the door for 
the contracts to be regulated as “futures”. In contrast, if the circle or book-out clause 
is used only for the purpose of shortening a circle, there seems to be no reason to 
regulate such commercial activities through financial regulation.   
                                                
101 See, e.g., the contracts in Re Bybee, 945 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1991).   
102 Spreadex Ltd. v. Battu [2005] EWCA Civ. 855 (CA).  
103 These are terms used by Judge Easterbrook in CFTC v. Zelender, 373 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2004). 
104 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982). 
105 The facts of this case has been illustrated in above 2.2.2. 
106 738 F.Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).   
107 [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 547 (QB).  
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The Bybee case provides another challenge. The “deferred delivery sale” allowed 
Bybee to take advantage of future price movement of precious metals with a down 
payment (thus resembling leverage). Bybee did not really take possession of the 
metals and the court even found that A-Mark implicitly represented that it would 
provide for offsetting contracts.108 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court emphasized 
the delivery obligation laid down in their contracts. It may be argued that the US court 
was rather too lenient towards Bybee. According to the notional transactions theory 
proposed above, the Bybee/A-Mark transactions look more notional than physical.  
However, this is not all bad news for commodity traders. Compared with CR Sugar, 
the Ninth Circuit Court was generous towards them. 
In sum, by comparing with the key characteristics of exchange trading, this paper 
argues that the boundary between regulated futures and unregulated commercial 
future delivery contracts lie in the boundary between notional trading and physical 
trading. Margin requirement, the existence of clearing houses, the use of standard 
forms and public bidding of prices may make a trading scheme similar to exchange 
trading (and thus provide a basis for regulation). But the ability to offset contrary 
trades is the key factor to determine whether a transaction should be regulated futures. 
We propose to review the context of the whole trading scheme offered by the scheme 
operator rather than focusing on whether contractual terms require delivery. Thus, a 
contract could be deemed to be notional when the trading scheme is largely for cash 
settlement rather than for physical delivery. In contrast, a contractual party might not 
escape from his obligation to perform a contract even merely because the contract is 
occasionally settled in cash. 
5. Conclusion: Return to CR Sugar 
In sum, this paper focuses on the distinction between regulated futures contracts and 
unregulated commercial sale of goods contracts based on case laws developed in U.K. 
and U.S. laws. Though the U.K. provides several guidelines to distinguish the two, 
there remains an uncertainty as is shown in the judgment of CR Sugar. Certain U.S. 
judgments also illustrated how commodity traders might incorporate features of 
futures exchange into a spot contract and the legal risk involved.  
                                                
108 945 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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This paper argues that physical delivery or the intention to deliver should not be used 
as an absolute criterion to distinguish between commercial future delivery contracts 
and financial futures contracts. This paper believes that the boundary between 
unregulated commercial sale of goods contracts and regulated futures contracts 
depends on whether a trading scheme offers a factual facility to offset contrary trades 
between two or among multiple parties. Thus, the boundary of futures regulation lies 
in the transition point between physical trading and notional trading, where 
transactions could be offset and settled in cash. 
CR Sugar is a difficult case and is more challenging than other U.S. cases because it 
involves put options rather than a straightforward future delivery contract. This raises 
the question of whether we should examine the purpose of the “options” or the 
purposes of the underlying forward transaction. Steel J seemed to adopt the latter 
approach.  However, a literal reading of the RAO 2001 might suggest that an option is 
a regulated investment if it is an option to acquire another investment. Thus, only 
options to acquire futures contracts for investment purpose should be regulated 
investments. If this construction is correct, the focus should be on the purpose of an 
option’s underlying future delivery contract rather than the option itself.   
Overall, this paper supports Steel J’s holding that the time to ascertain the intention 
and purpose of an option is the time when both parties enter into the transaction rather 
than when the option is exercised, as this could make the application of law less 
uncertain. But a subtler issue is to ascertain the essential characteristic of a 
commodity option. The main difficulty in identifying the real intention behind 
commodity options comes from the fact that there is always a chance that an option 
will not be exercised. Thus, there is always a certain degree of speculation in any 
option trading, even if the options are used for commercial (rather than investment) 
purposes.   
On the other hand, an option is destined to be exercised one day unless there are good 
reasons not to do so; otherwise there would be no point in CR continuing to pay 
premiums for these options. Steel J found out that CR and CSW had no intention to 
deliver and the main purpose of these options was to allow them to make a profit.109  
However, how did the parties exactly make a profit from the options was not fully 
                                                
109 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 279, 281 (Comm. Ct). 
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explained. Another critical fact is that the put options were deeply out of money when 
they were written,110 and thus it seems that the parties did not really expect the 
exercise of the options in the first place.  
This fact strengthens an argument that the main purpose of these put options was to 
create fictitious trading positions to allow CR to conduct futures trading in New York. 
Therefore, the whole trading scheme between CR and CSW looks more like sham 
transactions. Nevertheless, even so, it is still arguable whether the options in dispute 
should be of the kind for investment purposes under U.K. law and whether the FSA 
has an interest in regulating them in the U.K. 
In sum, CR Sugar sits on the boundary between physical trading and notional trading. 
The options were not clearly notional as they were not settled by cash and there were 
no contradictory trades. In contrast, they were not clearly physical as no intention to 
deliver was found and the only request for delivery was rejected by CSW. In the end, 
this may come down to the FSA clarifying the scope of regulated commodity options 
and whether commodity traders come within its jurisdiction.   
                                                
110 Id., at 180.  
